Political Prisoners in Burma (Myanmar)

------
This is a lengthy read, yet insightful and well-researched look at the political situation in Myanmar. This paper, written by me in March 2008, was presented as an assignment in POLS 530: International Negotiations; a course taught by Dr. Michael Fowler at the University of Louisville.
------

I. Introduction
Burma has been ruled for more than forty years by a military regime that has systematically impoverished a country once known for its high literacy rate, excellent universities, and abundant natural resources. Today, Burma (known as Myanmar[1] since 1989) is one of the most tightly controlled dictatorships in the world. Over the past few decades, the military regime in Burma has seized economic control of almost all natural resources, formed troublesome ties with Chinese, Indian, and Thai businessmen, and has severely diminished the standard of living for the people of Burma.

Basic human rights afforded to Burmese people have been on a decline since 1962. In response to the administration’s unabashed cruelty toward its own people, the military junta in Burma has received heavy protest on a number of occasions since the 1960s. These protests have resulted in the murder of thousands of activists, civilians, and most recently monks (in mid-August 2007)[2]. As a result of the military’s intolerance for democracy, an estimated 1,800 political prisoners are currently being detained in Burma’s prisons[3]. These political prisoners include the following groups of protestors (explained in more detail in the Arrested Developments section of this paper):

-Leaders of the ’88 Generation Students (leaders of the 1988 protest movement), such as Min Ko Naing;
-Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), who has been under house arrest on and off since 1990, and other political leaders such as U Win Tin, a journalist and member of the NLD, who at 79 is Burma’s oldest political prisoner[4]; and
-An estimated 706 activists and monks from the latest 2007 protests[5].

Little is known about the current health conditions of these political prisoners, however, in 1999, the Tatmadaw (armed forces) allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit all 35 prisons and about half of the 100 labor camps that held the detainees at that time. The Red Cross took note of “deplorable and life threatening” conditions, where these political prisoners, often university students, were tortured, malnourished, and refused basic medical care. Years later, in December, 2005, the Tatmadaw had a change of mind, and subsequently put and end to ICRC prison visits[6]. In November, 2006, news broke out that the Burmese government would now be forcing five of the country’s Red Cross field offices to close; thus, severely impeding humanitarian effort throughout the country[7]. It is often difficult to understand current situations in Myanmar due to tight restrictions of the media; however, what is known is that restrictions on prison visits by the ICRC are still being upheld.

For three years now, no international organization or human rights campaign has been allowed to visit Burma’s political prisoners. Although the ICRC has been denied access to visit political prisoners for the past three years, they still represent the best hope for Burma’s political inmates. In another sense, although the ICRC’s presence in Burma is currently being threatened by the military, they have historically been allotted more privileges than most other human rights organizations in the country; moreover, the ICRC still possess the greatest potential (of any international organization) to help reestablish communication and a basis for reform with the junta.

II. Historical Burma
After years of colonial rule by Britain, political interference by other countries (namely Japan), and a period of marginally successful independence, most of Burma’s history to date revolves around unstable, repressive, and controversial military-based regimes. Prior to 1962, Burma, for a short while experienced a multi-party system where its citizens actually elected the country’s leaders, and for many years boasted an impressive 90% literacy rate among its peoples.[8] Since 1962, when General Ne Win seized power from Prime Minister U Nu, Burma’s past successes have become a faint reminder of how much better things used to be.



A. Brief History behind the Uprising of 1988
General Ne Win, from the very beginning, had no patience or desire for democracy. On the contrary, his Council’s first policy document was entitled The Burmese Way to Socialism. Within two years, Ne Win’s military regime had caused enough damage to span decades. In 1964, Burmese citizens, who were already choking in the grip of poverty, witnessed their monetary reserves severely diminish in value due to a detrimental Demonetization Act. The demonetization rendered all K100 and K50 notes (historically, 4.6 kyat = $1 US) as unacceptable legal tender. As if becoming poorer overnight was not bad enough for Burmese people, Ne Win’s regime perpetuated years of isolationism, so-called ‘nationalism’ (demonstrated by ousting foreigners), and unanticipated links to Chinese communism which still haunt Myanmar today[9].

Following two more Demonetization Acts, financial hardship continued for all classes of people in Burma, making the country a “Least Developed Country” according to U.N. standards in 1987. During August of that same year, Ne Win admitted to serious mistakes made during his years in power in a radio speech.[10] For a nation financially torn to shreds and weary of a ‘socialist’ ideology that represented nothing short of absolute disaster, Ne Win’s words merely fueled the fire for the protests of 1988.

B. The Development of an Unstoppable Regime
Past 1988, a newly developed and stronger military regime, known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), came to power. As Western societies began to freeze disbursements of foreign aid to Myanmar, the SLORC found ways to stay afloat (even at the detriment to their own people). Over the next few years, signed contracts with Thai, South Korean, and Indian companies to exploit oil reserves off the coast of Myanmar helped provide an influx of cash to the junta. Today, these contracts have the ability to keep the junta rich and powerful, yet provide little or no benefit for the people of Burma[11].

III. Arrested Developments
For the sake of brevity, the next few sections will be condensed to discuss the ultimate arrest of Burma’s political prisoners.

A. University Students under Arrest
In 1988, a growing pro-democracy movement led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, of the National League for Democracy (NLD), and university students, crowded the streets in protest. During March 12-18, Burmese citizens and people around the globe witnessed the unfazed violent response by Burmese authorities, as they murdered hundreds of student protestors.[12] Those who survived were either arrested (with sentences averaging fourteen years) or lucky to escape.

The protests of 1988 have held long-standing consequences for a young generation of Burmese citizens as well as the country’s educational policies. As a result of the protests, universities were temporarily closed and students sent home; in fact, the universities in Rangoon have now been closed for much of the past ten years.[13]

B. Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD)
The daughter of a notable Burmese liberalist, Aung San Suu Kyi, became the head figure for a possible future of democracy in Burma beginning in the late 1960s. Suu Kyi rallied the people by constructing ideals that combined liberalism, humanism and Buddhism[14]. In 1988, Suu Kyi led the NLD and university students in what she refers to as “the second struggle for national independence.[15]” On September 27, 1988, in an organized election, Suu Kyi and the NLD won 392 of the 485 parliamentary seats, including all fifty-nine seats in Rangoon Division. The military-backed National Unity Party won only ten seats. Unfortunately, the will of the people to have Suu Kyi and the NLD lead their country, has yet to be substantiated. Election results from 1988 are continually de-legitimized by the SLORC, and no elected representatives from the NLD nor Aung San Suu Kyi have been permitted to take office. The SLORC, now known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), feels threatened by Suu Kyi and the NLD; therefore, they result to either violence (as witnessed in street protests in 1990) or arrests. Since the early 1990s, Suu Kyi has been placed under house-arrest three times, practically most of the last four decades. Anytime she is released from her sentence, the victory is always short-lived, as her rallies are always closely monitored and typically result in her being put back under house-arrest. Ultimately, the release of Suu Kyi is of great importance to Burmese people. However, her occasional release and is used by the SPDC as a media stunt rather than a genuine willingness to cooperate with the NLD.

C. Different Scene, Same Story: More Activists Arrested in 2007 Demonstrations
In 2007, people all over the world watched videos on the internet of a country in crisis, of journalists being shot in the streets, of panic and fear. In 2007, the pattern of public protests coupled with violent responses by the SPDC was witnessed once again. While the pattern for these protests was similar to the past, the stage this time around was set in a much different fashion. Instead of university students (who had been isolated and moved to remote campuses far from most major cities), or the NLD led by Suu Kyi (who was currently under house-arrest), the protests were led by hundreds of monks. With an estimated 706[16] activists (including some monks) put behind bars, the protests of 2007 represent the third major source of political prisoners arrested in the last forty years. According to Amnesty International, political activists continue to be arrested to this day. By estimation, “There have been 96 arrests since 1 November 2007.”[17]



IV. Understanding Motivations and Interests
Financially speaking, the SPDC has become almost invincible. According to Donald Seekins, the possibility of democracy over-riding the military anytime soon in Burma is quite unattainable, “because the post-1988 inclusion of raw material-exporting Burma within a new economic hierarchy insulates the junta from pressure exerted either by individual nations (American and European sanctions) or the international community…[including] a largely ineffective United Nations.”[18] So, while it may not follow a political agenda, the role of the International Red Cross within the borders of Myanmar is of crucial importance to humanitarian aid in the area; perhaps, an area where changes are more attainable than political policy. Specifically dealing with the treatment and unwarranted arrests of political activists, it is important to understand the SPDC’s interests and motivations behind these actions and their unwillingness to cooperate with the ICRC at this point in time.

Generally speaking the SPDC’s top underlying interests (in no particular order) are: 1) power (i.e. military strength); 2) state autonomy; 3) money and maintaining current cash flows (particularly linked to oil and natural gas); and 4) positional security[19]. Although the SPDC is interested in the economic stability of Myanmar, it is not apparent through their financial impositions on the general public. They are interested in, but not motivated by economic stability because the ruling elite enjoy many more privileges than most Burmese people, and as long as the world continues to demand more energy (and Myanmar’s neighbors continue to contribute), SPDC cash flow will be considerably guaranteed.

The fourth interest, positional security, is to be considered closely linked to the detainment of political prisoners in Burma. For the SPDC, having these educated activists at-large in the general population, threatens the very nature of their position in Burmese government. The people of Myanmar are ready for change, and the result is political unrest silenced by prison sentences, cruelty, and murder.

V. Conclusion
As the SPDC arrests and detains hundreds of peaceful protestors, it becomes increasingly obvious that something must be done. Students, members of the NLD, and organized Buddhist monks, currently sit in jail cells completely cut-off from any future that ever existed. Although under more and more pressure from the SPDC to close its locations, the ICRC has been able to work with the regime to maintain (at least) a minimal presence in the country. The ICRC’s work in Burmese prisons has been halted since 2005, but the organization is still in the best position to help political prisoners in Myanmar; in fact, according to a former political prisoner, “during my years in prison, the eternal agency that had the greatest positive impact on prison conditions and the lives of the inmates was the ICRC.”[20] With that in mind, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) must find ways to not only re-gain access to political prisoners, but must find ways to ensure a better future for these people. The release of these prisoners is the ultimate goal. These brave men and women are the future of change in Myanmar, but are currently silenced behind the guns of an illegitimate[21] military-rule.


-------
Sources:
[1] “Burma” and “Myanmar” are used interchangeably in this document to mean the Union of Myanmar.
[2] Seekins, Donald M. The Geopolitics and Economics of Burma’s Military Regime, 1962-2007: Understanding SPDC Tyranny. Japan Focus. November 12, 2007: pp.2-4.
[3] Human Rights Watch. Burma: Referendum a Sham Unless Repression Ends. Human Rights News. New York. February 11, 2008. www.hrw.org.
[4] Human Rights Watch. www.hrw.org.
[5] Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma). Data – Arrested on August 19 to date, 2007. Updated January 30, 2008. www.aappb.org.
[6] Falco, Mathea. Burma: Time for Change. Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. 2003: p.16.
[7] BBC News. Burma ‘closes’ Red Cross offices. Updated Monday, 27 November 2006. news.bbc.co.uk
[8] Falco, p.7.
[9] Bixler, Norma. Burma: A Profile. Praeger Publishers. New York, NY. 1971: pp.78-87.
[10] Seekins, Donald M. Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar). Scarecrow Press. Lanham, Maryland. 2006: pp.xxvii-xxviii.
[11] Seekins, Geopolitics, pp.9-10.
[12] Seekins, Geopolitics, p.1.
[13] Falco, p.13.
[14] Gravers, Mikael. Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma: An Essay on the Historical Practice of Power. Curzon Press. Second Edition, 1999: pp.73-77.
[15] Suu Kyi, Aung San. Freedom from Fear and Other Writings; Speech to a Mass Rally at the Shwedagon Pagoda. Edited by Michael Aris. Penguin Books. London, England. 1995: p.193.
[16] Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma). Data – Arrested on August 19 to date, 2007. Updated January 30, 2008. www.aappb.org.
[17] Amnesty International. Arrests of Political Activists Increase in Myanmar. Amnesty International Online. 25 January 2008. www.amnesty.org.
[18] Seekins, Geopolitics, p.11.
[19] A term I use to describe the SPDC’s fear of pro-democratic threats. The SPDC’s actions often reflect their interest in not wanting to feel threatened their interest to maintain their position in Myanmar.
[20] Pedersen, Morten B. Promoting Human Rights in Burma: A Critique of Western Sanctions Policy. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Lanham, Maryland. 2008: p.245.
[21] Referring to the 1988 victory of the NLD, and the denial of the SPDC to allow those elected leaders to take office.
[*] Photographs: from Google image search engine. Uploaded by URL. Not intended to represent my own work.
[**] Video: embedded from YouTube 07/11/2009; username: AlJazeeraEnglish.